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In an attempt to identify constitutionally acceptable procedures
for governmental decisionmaking, a critical assessment is underway
of virtually all procedures for allocating government benefits (or im-
posing burdens). Initiated by the Supreme Court in noncriminal
areas,' the undertaking has grown to involve other policymakers2 as
well as other areas of law. 3 In a democracy, acceptable procedures can
be identified only after considering the perceptions that participants
have of the procedures and the relation of those perceptions to pref-
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1. The Supreme Court's recent focus on procedural due process can be dated from
two landmark cases, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Sniadach the Court held that, absent a showing of special
need, the garnishment of wages prior to a hearing was not permitted by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. In Goldberg the Court held that states must afford
welfare recipients an evidentiary hearing before terminating benefits. The Goldberg
opinion is particularly significant because the Court described in considerable detail the
characteristics of a decisionmaking process that would satisfy the hearing requirement
established in that case. Id. at 267-71.
2. For example, the Committee on Informal Action of the Administrative Conference
of the United States is at the time of this writing conducting a major study of procedural
issues. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 43944 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 9223 (1974). Early in 1976 the
National Labor Relations Board created a task force to review and evaluate NLRB
procedures and practices. See 40 Fed. Reg. 53441-42 (1975). Related assessments of due
process requirements include Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings
for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 Micn. L. REV. Ill
(1972); Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REv. 585 (1972); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical
and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELH. L. REV. 772 (1974); Verkuil, A Study
of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Ci. L. REV. 739 (1976).
3. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process in revocation of parole).
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erences among alternative procedures. 4 The views of disputing parties
should be given most attention because these parties are directly af-
fected by the choice of procedure. Sharper definition of disputants'
views can be gained by examining the perceptions and preferences of
those taking other roles in the proceeding-such third parties as judges
and arbitrators.
Previous empirical investigation has focused on the satisfaction of
participants with various procedures.a But in all of those investiga-
tions the researchers imposed criteria by constraining the attributes
that respondents were asked to use in evaluating procedures.6 That
research provides important insights into factors affecting accept-
ability of procedures. It does not, however, allow an understanding
of either the criteria that unconstrained individuals use to differen-
tiate among procedures or the relationship of those criteria to indi-
vidual preferences for procedures. Moreover, there may be an addi-
tional problem with previous empirical research if satisfaction is af-
fected by familiarity and cultural acceptance. Although the adversary
system of dispute resolution is familiar in the United States, it is
not characteristic of all societies. In continental Europe common
modes of dispute resolution include inquisitorial or autocratic ele-
ments. 7 The previous efforts to examine the effects of culture have
4. See J. C.sI'Lr, ANERICAN CRlINxAL JUsTIcE 3, 168-74 (1972). Other scholars have
suggested acceptability as one criterion for evaluating procedures. See Boyer, supra note
2, at 137; Cramton, supra note 2, at 591-93; Verkuil, supra note 2, at 742-57. The Supreme
Court has also recognized tile importance of the participants' acceptance of the pro-
cedures. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972); In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1, 26
(1967).
5. J. TillISAUT & L. VALKLR, PROCLDURAL Jusricu: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67-116
(1975); LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, Some Determinants of Preference for Modes
of Conflict Resolution, 20 J. CONFLr RrSOLUTION 319 (1976); Thibaut, Walker, LaTour
& Houlden, Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAiN. L. REv. 1271 (1974); Walker, LaTour,
Lind & Thibaut, Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J.
APPLIED Soc. PsYcH. 295 (1974); LaTour, Determinants of Participant and Observer Satis-
faction with Adversarial and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication (1974) (unpublished
M.A. thesis in University of North Carolina Graduate Library).
6. For example, in LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, supra note 5, the experi-
menters chose the eight features (e.g., opportunity for evidence presentation, certainty
tlat a decision would be made) that they thought represented the major dimensions
underlying preferences for procedures. Each subject then indicated tie extent to which
his ideal conflict-resolution procedure would include each of tile eight features. The
experimenters tlus constrained the subjects' evaluation of procedures to tile eight
procedural attributes.
7. For example, the course of civil litigation in the Federal Republic of Germany is
dominated by the judge. The court has responsibility for obtaining service of summonses
and pleadings and for taking measures to reduce the conflict to its essential issues before
trial. The judge may require clarification of allegations made in writing, and he can
lequire documents or other information from public authorities. The German judge's
control is perlaps most apparent where there is an issue of fact to be determined. In a
proof-taking session tie order of evidence and witness examination is determined solely
259
The Yale Law Journal
been somewhat limited because the procedures evaluated in those
studies were restricted to a few examples of familiar models.,
This article reports a study intended to resolve those problems.
Individuals in both the United States and Germany were asked to
judge the similarity of 12 model procedures, to state their preferences
for each of those procedures, and to evaluate the characteristics of
the 12 models. Our objectives were first, to determine the criteria
that unconstrained individuals would adopt to differentiate among
procedures, and second, to learn how preferences for particular pro-
cedural models were related to those criteria. A third objective was
to determine the extent to which role and nationality affect those
criteria and preferences. Insofar as transnational preferences are simi-
lar, we can assume with greater confidence that perceptions about
various procedures do not vary significantly among regions or groups.
I. Background: Prior Research
The present investigation is the culmination of a systematic, long-
term effort to use social psychological theory and scientific methods
to examine important aspects of the legal process.9 Although the
present study is more ambitious in its conception and sophisticated in
its technique than its predecessors, it was designed and executed in
light of research already completed. If the earlier results are corrob-
orated by those presently obtained, confidence in both will be sub-
stantially heightened.10 Therefore, a brief review of prior research
is a useful prologue to this article.
The present study is a part of an undertaking that has involved
a series of experiments developed to elicit and explore the responses
by the judge. The judge call call for the production of documents by tile parties on his
own motion. The judge decides whether expert testimony is needed and which expert
to call. Expert witnesses are chosen by the judge from an official list and are com-
pletely identified with the court. The majority of questions to witnesses are posed by
the judge, and in most instances the record is a dictated narration of the evidence as
formulated by the court. The judge is affirmatively required to investigate all aspects
of a case for the purpose of ascertaining objective truth. See generally 2 E. Con'N,
MANUAL OF GLRMAN LAW (2d ed. 1971); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure (pts. 1-2), 71 HARV. L. RLV. 1193, 14-43 (1958).
As in a civil case, the stages of a criminal case, including the interrogation of wit-
nesses, is mainly controlled and carried out by a judge. German Code of Criminal
Procedure § 244. In addition, § 261 requires tle court to evaluate the evidence freely,
without regard to highly developed rules.
8. See p. 263 infra.
9. The origin of the project and the results of earlier investigations are discussed in
J. TnlBAUT & L. WVALKER, supra note 5, at 1-5, 117-24.
10. See Campbell & Fiske, Convergent and Discritninant Validation by the Multitrail-
Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOLOcICAL BULL. 81, 100-04 (1959).
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of individuals to various modes of dispute resolution. The initial
studies examined how different procedures actually work. Topics in-
cluded, for example, the effect of different model procedures on the
discovery and transmission of evidence,"' the relative capacity of the
models to combat bias in decisionmakers,'12 and the capacity of alterna-
tive models to deal with internal bias resulting from the order in
which evidence is presented.1 3 Later, the research focus shifted to the
perception and evaluation of various procedures. The present in-
vestigation is intended to extend this second line of inquiry.
The earlier research provided a foundation for the present study
by suggesting certain predictions about the criteria (or "dimensions")
that unconstrained individuals use to differentiate among procedures
and about the preferences that such individuals consequently exhibit.
Specifically, a number of earlier studies suggested two salient cri-
teria in evaluating different procedures for resolving conflicts between
two parties: (i) the degree of third-party control over the decision,
and (ii) the degree of disputant control over the process of evidence
presentation. The former criterion was included expressly in previous
investigations and was identified consistently by respondents as a
prominent and preferred procedural characteristic.: 4 The latter cri-
terion was inferred from prior experiments in which the degree of
opportunity for evidence presentation by disputants was highly cor-
related with those procedures preferred by respondents.'3 *We hy-
pothesized that this response reflected a preference for procedures that
gave disputants control over the process of dispute resolution, com-
parable to the expressed preference for procedures that gave third
parties control over the final decision that resolved the dispute.'
Therefore, we introduced into the present study a new set of criteria
concerning control over the process of evidence presentation in ad-
11. See Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary
and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MicH. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
12. See Thibaut, Walker 9- Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-
inaking, 86 HARv. L. Rrv. 386 (1972).
13. See Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216
(1972).
1. See Houlden, LaTour, Walker & Thibaut, Preferences for Modes of Dispute
Resolution as a Funclion of Proces and Decision Control, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
(1977; forthcoming); LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, supra note 5, at 351; Thibaut,
Walker, LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1282-88.
15. LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, supra note 5, at 331-34; Thibaut, Walker,
LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1283-84, 1288; Walker, LaTour, Lind & Thibaut,
S1upra note 5, at 303; LaTour, supra note 5, at 73-75.
16. This hypothesis was supported by research indicating that control over the
process of evidence presentation and control over the final decision exerted independent
effects on preferences for procedures. Houlden, LaTour, Walker & Thibaut, supra note
14.
The Yale Law Journal
dition to the previously tested set of criteria concerning opportunity
for evidence presentation. We expected that the more a procedure
afforded disputants control over the process of evidence presentation
and third parties control over the decision, the more it would be
preferred.
Previous research also suggested that giving respondents different
roles in the present experiment .would lay the foundation for fruit-
ful comparison of their distinct perspectives. For example, the pro-
cedural preferences of third parties seem to differ somewhat from
those of disputants.17 It appears that third parties are more concerned
than litigants with exercising control over the decision but are less
concerned than litigants with exercising control over the process of
evidence presentation.' 8 Thus, the dimension of third-party decision
control should be more important in determining third-party pref-
erences, while the dimension of control over the process of evidence
presentation should be more important in determining disputant
preferences.
Furthermore, prior research indicated that disputants themselves
have different preferences depending on their particular role in a
conflict. 19 Disputants may, in particular, find themselves either advan-
taged or disadvantaged by the readily discoverable evidence.20 In a
previous investigation, each individual was placed in one of these two
situations or in a third situation in which the individual did not
know whether he would later be advantaged or disadvantaged. 2' Al-
though the results showed remarkable similarity in preference among
the three roles, individuals advantaged by the evidence exhibited
greater preference than the disadvantaged individuals for procedures
that maximized third-party control over evidence presentation and
decisionmaking. In contrast, individuals disadvantaged by the evi-




20. As discussed in J. RiwvLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971), a disputant may be rela-
tively advantaged or disadvantaged in a number of ways: for example, by social class,
his natural assets and abilities, the society in which he lives, or the generation to which
lie belongs. Id. at 137. The characteristics specified by Rawls may often result in con-
crete differences in the amount of evidence available to a disputant. Since the distribu-
tion of available evidence is easily varied for experimental purposes, we incorporated
relative advantage into our studies by favoring one disputant with the weight of avail-
able evidence.
21. See Tlhibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1275-76. The third
situation was suggested in J. RAwas, supra note 20, at 137.
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these procedural elements.22 Individuals who did not know their evi-
dentiary status preferred, and judged to be fair, procedures they
believed favored the disadvantaged but afforded both sides access to
channels of communication and to mechanisms of control.2
The present study was shaped not only by the insights of prior
investigations but also by their limitations. One previous experiment,
for example, showed few transnational differences in preference, but
only four familiar procedural alternatives were evaluated.24 They
were intended to represent "inquisitorial," "single investigator," "dou-
ble investigator," and "adversary" models, which were viewed as dis-
tinct points along a spectrum of relative adversariness. Subsequent
analysis of the experimental results, however, suggested that the dis-
tribution of control between decisionmaker and disputants is a more
realistic and far more comprehensive dimension than relative ad-
versariness. 25 For the present study, therefore, the procedural choices
were conceived as ranging from models in which the decisionmaker
has total control to those in which the disputants have total control.
Twelve fundamental models were constructed by systematically al-
tering the roles of the disputants and the presence and roles of other
participants. The precise description of these basic models, as it was
provided to the respondents in the study, is reproduced in the Ap-
pendix to this article.20 The 12 procedural models were:
(i) single court investigator with the judge role active;
(ii) single court investigator with the judge role passive;
(iii) double investigator;
(iv) autocratic;
22. See Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1283-84. The experi-
ment studied preferences for five dispute-resolution procedures: inquisitorial, single
investigator, double investigator, adversary, and bargaining. These procedures, described
in id. at 1273-75, differ somewhat from the similarly named ones used in the present
study. The previous study found that regardless of role, respondents most preferred
the adversary procedure, followed in order by the double investigator, inquisitorial, single
investigator, and bargaining procedures. Advantaged parties, however, preferred in-
quisitorial and single investigator procedures more than did parties disadvantaged by
the e idence, while disadvantaged parties preferred adversary and bargaining procedures
more than did advantaged parties.
23. Id. at 1288-89.
24. See Lind, Erickson, Friedland & Dickenberger, A Cross-national Study of Reactions
to Adjudicative Procedural Models (undated) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The
research on which this paper is based was completed prior to 1975 and is summarized
in J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 5, at 78-80.
25. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 5, at 117-22.
26. The procedures are given descriptie names in the Appendix to facilitate under-
standing of the comparative models and to relate them to material in the text of the
article. In the investigation the models were given randomly selected alphabetical
denominations.
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(viii) moot with a representative for each disputant;
(ix) mediation with a representative for each disputant;
(x) moot;
(xi) bargaining with a representative for each disputant;
(xii) bargaining.
This is believed to be the largest set of discrete procedural alternatives
ever assembled for comparative study.
I. The Method of the Present Study
A. Multidimensional Scaling
Until recently, no precise method existed for determining the basic
criteria by which unconstrained individuals differentiate among pro-
cedures or how those basic criteria are related to preferences. Within
the last decade, however, psychologists have developed and refined a
technique known as multidimensional scaling, which allows the re-
searcher to present a number of stimuli (objects, attributes, or ideas)
to unconstrained individuals in a way that can reveal the essential
dimensions these individuals employ in discriminating among the
stimuli.2 7 Significantly, the researcher need not give the stimuli names
or characteristics that otherwise might bias the respondents' percep-
tions of them. An associated technique allows the researcher separately
to label the dimensions and to determine how preference is related
to the basic dimensions discerned by the respondents. 2s
27. See generally P. GREEN SL F. CARMONE, MUILTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING AND REL\TED
TECHNIQUrS IN MARKLTING ANALYSIS (1970); I MULTIDIMENSIONAL ScLtN.: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (R. Shepard, A. Romney & S. Ncrlove eds.
1972).
28. The employment of multidimensional scaling required subjects to make responses
in a fashion rather different from subjects in previous inestigations. Individuals were
presented with a variety of dispute-resolution procedures and asked to make judgments
about the degree of similarity between each procedure and every other procedure in turn.
Mathematical calculations transformed these similarity judgments so as to array the pro-
cedures on the smallest possible number of uncorrelated dimensions necessary to account
for the individuals' similarity judgments. In essence the process was intended to reveal
the independent criteria that seem most closely associated with the actual judgments
about similarity and hence to lay the basis for determining what criteria may have been
salient or significant 'to the subjects in making those judgments.
The labeling of the dimensions generated by multidimensional scaling can be
facilitated in a number of ways, e.g., by asking individuals to evaluate with respect to a
number of characteristics or attributes the same procedures for which similarity judg-
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B. The Experiment
The participants in the investigation were 128 student volunteers
at each site. At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill there
were 96 undergraduates and 32 law students; in Hamburg, Germany
there were also 96 undergraduates (including some high school stu-
dents) and 32 law students.2 9 Essentially the same procedure was
used at both sites.30
The participants reported to the study in groups of eight. The
undergraduate participants were told that they were going to assume
the role of disputants and participate in the resolution of a conflict.
The law students were told that they were going to assume the role
of decisionmakers or third parties and possibly aid in the resolution
of a dispute. Law students were asked to act as decisionmakers be-
cause we thought that the choice to attend law school was an act of
self-selection that indicated their attitudes would more closely re-
semble those of actual decisionmakers than would the attitudes of
other students. Furthermore, we felt that the law students' legal train-
ing made them more suitable for and comfortable in this role than
undergraduates.
All participants at both sites were told that the conflict involved
a dispute in which Zemp (the Plaintiff) had charged Adams (the
ments were made. (This is the point in the multidimensional scaling process at which the
experimenter's bias can have an effect. If the attributes that the experimenter chooses for
the subjects are limited, a complete labeling of all dimensions may not be possible. Such
an occurrence would alert an investigator to the possibility that there were important
attributes that had not been considered.) Correlational techniques are then used to
determine which attributes are most closely associated with each dimension and thus
may be taken to provide the best labeling for that dimension. Finally, preference judg-
ments are similarly correlated with the basic dimensions to determine the extent to
which each of the dimensions is associated with procedural preferences. Thus, the process
is essentially one of labeling each dimension by identifying those attributes that best
characterize it and then similarly identifying the procedural preferences that best fit each
dimension.
29. The student participants in Germany and the United States were approximately
the same age and had attained approximately the same level of education.
No effort was made, however, to obtain a random sample for all populations to which
the results of this study might be applied. The purpose of this research is to test and
develop a theoretical conception of the factors affecting perceptions of and preferences
for various types of procedures. Hence we seek to discover functional relationships be-
tween theoretically defined variables rather than, as in survey research, to discover the
incidence or the magnitude of any phenomenon in the population. Research aimed at
developing theory and testing functional relationships is not critically dependent on
random sampling. See Kruglanski & Kroy, Outcome Validity In Experimental Research:
A Re.Conceptualization, 7 REPRESENTATIVE REsERCH Soc. PsYcH. (1976; forthcoming). In
any case, given mass access to undergraduate education in both the United States and
Germany, the participants represent important segments of the public in both countries.
30. Translation of the Hamburg materials was done by a native German speaker, Pro-
fessor Gfinter Roth of the University of Hamburg.
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Defendant) with assault. Participants were told that they would be
given a summary of the case and a collection of facts containing
bits of evidence about the incident. It was explained that these
materials would be used in ultimately resolving the dispute and
that the party favored by the final decision would receive a five-dollar
prize.31 All of the participants were told they would be allowed to
choose the procedure that they wished to use in settling the conflict,
and they were advised to be very careful about their choice because
the outcome of the dispute could well vary as a function of the
hearing procedure. A brief summary of the case was then distributed
along with a simple rule of law relating to self-defense. Both the brief
statement of the case and the rule of law given to the respondents
are found in the Appendix to this article.
At this point in the experiment, two-thirds (64) of the under-
graduate subjects were assigned by a flip of a coin to assume the role
of either the advantaged or the disadvantaged party.32 Separate sessions
were held for the one-third (32) of the undergraduate subjects who
were to remain uncertain of their ultimate role. These subjects were
told that their roles would be assigned after they had chosen a hearing
procedure. The 32 law students also participated separately. Their
roles, and hence their instructions, were different from those of all
undergraduates. In all, there were four roles: advantaged disputant,
disadvantaged disputant, uncertain disputant, and third party. Each
of these roles was played by 32 subjects at each site.
Next, all subjects received the items of evidence. There were 10
statements favorable to Zemp and four statements favorable to Adams.
These statements had been used in previous research and were se-
lected so that Zemp would be clearly advantaged both by the number
of items of evidence and by their degree of favorability.33 Each par-
ticipant was then given 12 cards, each of which contained a descrip-
tion of a particular hearing procedure. 34
The multidimensional scaling method required that ratings of the
degree of similarity of every possible pair of procedural models be
obtained. The scaling method also required that expressions of pref-
31. An approximately equivalent sum in deutschmarks was used in the German
sessions.
32. The subjects in each group of eight were randomly assigned odd or e~cn num-
bers. It was then announced that if hcads turned up odd numbers would take the role
of Adams and even numbers Zemp, and vice versa if tails turned up.
33. See Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1276.
34. After the experiment these procedures were given names, which are listed at pp.
263-64 supra. The descriptions printed on the cards given the respondents are re-
produced in the Appendix.
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erence for each of the 12 procedures be obtained and that each pro-
cedure be judged on the extent to which it embodied certain at-
tributes or characteristics. This requirement for extensive responses
by participants necessitated dividing the investigation into two parts,
so that half (16) of the participants in each of the four roles at each
site performed certain tasks and the other half other tasks. In all,
64 subjects at each site completed a similarity rating questionnaire
that required them to consider every possible pair of the 12 procedures
and thereby to judge how similar each procedure was to each of the
others.35 These subjects also completed a preference rating question-
naire with respect to each of the 12 procedures. 0 The other 64 sub-
jects at each site were asked to complete an attribute rating question-
naire.37 They judged the extent to which 15 attributes characterized
each of the 12 procedures.38 The attributes were:
(i) opportunity for presentation of evidence by the advantaged
party;
(ii) opportunity for presentation of evidence by the disadvan-
taged party;
(iii) third-party control over the process of evidence presenta-
tion; ,
35. Judgments were made on a nine-point scale on which 1 represented "very dis-
similar," 5 represented "neither similar nor dissimilar," and 9 represented "very similar."
36. Judgments were made on a 31-point scale on which -15 represented "strongly
prefer not to use" and +15 "strongly prefer to use."
37. The particular division of tasks was intended to equalize the time and effort
required of the participants. Also, the particular arrangement was adopted so that those
subjects who made similarity ratings did so before expressing preferences, thereby avoid-
ing bias that might result from making preference judgments firsL Similarly, those sub-
jects who made attribute judgments did so without having expressed any preferences.
The data from two Hamburg subjects were eliminated because they failed to answer all
the attribute ratings questions. These subjects were both in the condition (or "cell")
w1here they were uncertain of their relative evidentiary advantage. Thus, only 14 Hamburg
subjects remained in that condition. Though both subjects who failed to complete their
taks were in the same condition, there is no evidence that the features of that condition
were responsible for their failure.
This incident occasions comment on whether the number of subjects in the present
study was sufficient to yield statistically reliable results. The decision concerning the
number of subjects to study was based largely on the desired "power" of the statistical
tests to be employed. "Power" refers to the ability to detect true differences among the
experimental conditions. The greater the number of subjects, the greater the power of
the statistical test. Fourteen to sixteen subjects per condition is a sufficiently large num-
ber to ensure the detection of meaningful differences but not so large a number as to
detect statistically significant differences that are of very small magnitude. For a dis-
cussion of size and power, see B. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLrS IN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
220-28 (2d ed. 1971).
38. Judgments were made on a 31-point scale on which -15 represented "very clearly
not a feature" and +15 "very clearly a feature."
39. We intended that the attribute of control over the process of evidence presentation
mean control oser the quantity and quality of information reaching the decisionmaker.
Hence, the intended meaning was very similar to that of the attribute of opportunity for
presentation of esidence. See pp. 280-81 infra.
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(iv) third-party control over the final determination of who
wins and who loses the dispute;
(v) the advantaged party's control over the process of evidence
presentation;
(vi) the disadvantaged party's control over the process of evi-
dence presentation;
(vii) the advantaged party's control over the final determina-
tion of who wins and who loses the dispute;
(viii) the disadvantaged party's control over the final determi-
nation of who wins and who loses the dispute;
(ix) the likelihood that the method will result in pleasantness;
(x) fairness in deciding the conflict;
(xi) the amount of time required;
(xii) probability of resulting in the best possible decision
(closest to the truth);
(xiii) certainty that a decision will be made one way or the
other;
(xiv) favors the advantaged party;
(xv) favors the disadvantaged party.
For the most part, the characteristics included in the questionnaire
were modifications of attribute measures used in prior studies.4 The
attributes relating explicitly to control were developed after studying
earlier results and hence were used for the first time in this investiga-
tion.41
Finally, all subjects answered a question intended to show whether
they correctly perceived that the evidence favored Zemp more than
Adams. 42 This completed the experiment. 43
III. Results
As a preliminary matter it is important to be assured that the
participants perceived Zemp to be advantaged by the evidence. The
mean response of all subjects on the question concerning evidentiary
advantage reliably indicated that subjects indeed believed that Zemp
40. See Lind, Erickson, Friedland & Dickenberger, supra note 24, at 8; Thibaut,
Walker, LaTour & Houlden, supra note 5, at 1278.
41. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKR, supra note 5, at 117-22.
42. Judgments were made on a nine-point scale oil which 1 represented "the evidence
favors Adams," 5 represented "the evidence favors neither Adams nor Zemp," and 9
represented "the evidence favors Zemp."
43. At the close of each research session, the participants were given an explanation
of the study, paid for their participation, and asked not to discuss the investigation with
others.
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was in an advantaged position and that Adams was in a disadvantaged
position. 44
A. Analysis of the Similarity Judgments
Judgments about the similarities and dissimilarities among the pro-
cedures were processed by a multidimensional-scaling computer pro-
gram that constructs a map, or plot, of the way in which procedures
are perceived.4 5 It also allows the researcher to determine what dif-
ferences, if any, exist in the perception of the procedures as a function
of role or site. The results of the computer analysis indicated that
three dimensions were necessary to account for the differences that the
subjects perceived among the procedures.40 The analysis revealed only
minor differences in the perception of the procedures as a function
of the four roles and two sites in the study. Apparently there was a
common perception of the similarities and differences among pro-
cedures.
The subjects' placement of the 12 procedures in the common three-
dimensional space is presented in Table 1, which shows the coordinates
of each of the procedures. The table shows for each dimension how
much the key attribute of that dimension-whatever it may be-is
embodied in each of the 12 procedures. Large positive numbers indi-
cate that the attribute is present in the procedure to a high degree;
large negative numbers indicate that the attribute is hardly or not
at all present in the procedure. Positive and negative numbers result
from an arbitrary division of the scale.
Before attempting to label the three dimensions formally, it may
be helpful to consider the reported perceptions intuitively. A careful
examination of the coordinates indicates that all procedures with posi-
tive values on dimension one (e.g., single investigator (active judge),
double investigator, arbitration) give the third party control over the
decision, while all procedures with negative values on dimension one
4-. See note 42 supra. The mean response of all subjects was 6.644. This was above
the neutral point 5 by a statistically significant margin. For a discussion of the meaning
of statistical significance, see note 57 infra.
45. The computer program used was ALSCAL. See generally Takane, Young & de
Lecuw, Nonmetric Individual Differences-Multidizensional Scaling: An Alternating
Least Square Method with Optimal Scaling Features, 42 PSYCHO, ETRIaA (1977; forth-
coming).
46. The dimensions are uncorrelated in the sense that the location of a stimulus
(procedure) on one dimension is unrelated to its location on another dimension. Three
dimensions were chosen because they were sufficient to explain the distances (differences)
among the procedures that were derived from the similarity data. Addition of a fourth
dimension did not appreciably increase the extent to which the distances among pro-
cedures could be explained.
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TABLE 1
Coordinates of Procedures on Each of the Three Dimensions
Averaged Across Hamburg and Chapel Hill Subjects in All Roles*
Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3










Moot with Representatives - .72
Mediation with Representatives - .87
Moot - .91
Bargaining with Representatives -1.28
Bargaining -1.37
* The larger the number the greater the extent to which
























a procedure is characterized
(e.g., bargaining, moot, mediation with representatives) reserve con-
trol over the decision to the disputants. Thus, we can informally label
this dichotomous first dimension as third-party decision control (or
lack of disputant decision control).47 As this dimension accounts for
the greatest proportion of the differences perceived to exist among pro-
cedures, it may be said that third-party decision control is the most
salient dimension for distinguishing among the procedures.
The second dimension also appears to involve a rather dichotomous
categorization of the procedures-the presence or absence of represen-
tatives or investigators. Procedures with positive values on this dimen-
sion (e.g., double investigator, moot with representatives, adversary)
involve representatives or investigators, while those with negative
values (e.g., arbitration, autocratic, mediation) do not involve such
persons.
The arrangement of procedures on the third dimension is not dichot-
omous. The procedures are arrayed along the dimension in a more
continuous manner. Those with positive values are adversary, moot
47. There is always the possibility that any correlational technique may produce
spurious relationships. Where, as here, the results largely confirm predictions based on
theoretical considerations and prior research, the possibility of spurious relationships is
minimal.
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with representatives, moot, arbitration, mediation with representatives,
double investigator, and mediation, while those with negative values
are bargaining, single investigator (active judge), bargaining with rep-
resentatives, single investigator (passive judge), and autocratic. Pre-
vious research suggests that some of the procedures given negative
values (e.g., autocratic, single investigator) are perceived as unfair and
as providing too little opportunity for evidence presentation, while
some of the procedures rated positively on this dimension (e.g., ad-
versary, arbitration, mediation) have been rated highly in these re-
spects. 48 Bargaining, however, which was given a negative value on
dimension three, was previously rated moderately high on opportunity
for evidence presentation and low on fairness. 49 Therefore, it is dif-
ficult informally to discern a precise relationship between these
previously identified criteria and dimension three.
B. Formal Labeling of the Dimensions
A correlational mapping technique was employed to achieve a more
precise labeling of the basic dimensions by which the respondents
discriminated among procedures. The technique allows one to map
attribute judgments into the perceptual space as vectors. 3 The po-
sition of a procedure along a vector reflects the extent to which re-
spondents perceive the procedure as possessing the particular attribute.
The best label for a given dimension is an attribute vector that is
maximally correlated (or coincident) with that dimension and mini-
mally correlated with other dimensions.
A preliminary mapping of the 15 attributes used in the study, done
separately for each combination of role and site, revealed no major
differences in the labeling implicitly provided by the subjects. This,
together with the fact that the subjects' perceptions of the similarity
of the procedures did not differ as a function of role or site, enabled
us to obtain a common labeling of the dimensions.- 1
48. Houlden, LaTour, Walker & Thibaut, supra note 14; LaTour, Houldcn, Walker &
Thibaut, supra note 5, at 331-34; Walker, LaTour, Lind & Thibaut, supra note 5, at
303; LaTour, supra note 5, at 73-75.
49. LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, supra note 5, at 334.
50. Attribute Nectors in two-dimensional space are like lines on a graph. They pass
through the origin or midpoint of the axes, but usually lie at an angle to the axes. In
this study, the vectors were plotted in three-dimensional space, because three dimensions
were needed to account for the procedural differences perceived by the subjects. See note
46 supra. The plotting technique involhed use of a computer program called PREF-MAP.
See P. GREEN' & F. C.R.IONE, supra note 27, at 78-81.
51. Labeling of dimensions one and two was remarkably similar for Hamburg and
Chapel Hill subjects. Hamburg subjects' labeling of dimension three was essentially the
same as that of Chapel Hill subjects, but the Hamburg subjects were not as definite in
their labeling of this dimension.
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Table 2 presents the direction cosines of each attribute vector for
each of the three dimensions. -' The direction cosines indicate the
extent to which each attribute vector is correlated with each dimen-
sion. The larger the direction cosine, whether positive or negative,
the greater is the correlation between an attribute and a dimension
and, therefore, the better the attribute labels the dimension. A posi-
tive direction cosine indicates a positive correlation between the di-
mension and the attribute: the attribute is increasingly characteristic
of procedures increasingly valued along the dimension. For example,
third-party control over the final decision, which has a .952 direction
cosine for dimension one, increases from procedures with low values
on dimension one (e.g., adversary) to procedures with high values on
dimension one (e.g., single investigator with active judge). Conversely,
a negative direction cosine indicates a negative correlation between
the dimension and the attribute: the attribute is decreasingly charac-
teristic of procedures increasingly valued along the dimension. For
example, Adams's control over the final decision, which has a -. 978
direction cosine for dimension one, decreases from procedures with
low values on dimension one to procedures with high values on di-
mension one. Thus, either large positive direction cosines or large
negative ones suggest a label for the dimension. Several highly cor-
related attributes suggest alternative labels.
In this light, there appear to be several attributes that could ap-
propriately label dimension one. Highly positively correlated with
that dimension are the certainty that a decision will be reached, the
extent to which the advantaged party (Zemp) is favored, third-party
control over the decision, and third-party control over the process
of evidence presentation. Highly negatively correlated with dimension
one are the extent to which the disadvantaged party (Adams) is favored,
disputants' control over the decision, the amount of time taken, and
disputants' control over the process of evidence presentation.
In contrast to the great number of attributes that are highly cor-
related with dimension one, only a single attribute closely coincides
with dimension two: pleasantness. Dimension three appears to be re-
lated to the opportunity of the advantaged party (Zemp) to present
evidence and to the likelihood that the best possible decision will
be reached. Opportunity of the disadvantaged party (Adams) to present
52. A direction cosine indicates tie angle between a vector and an axis. Tile larger
the absolute value of the cosine, the smaller is the angle between a vector and an axis
and the more closely related they are.
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TABLE 2
Direction Cosines of Attribute Vectors
Averaged Across Hamburg and Chapel Hill Subjects in All Roles'
Direction Cosines Direction Cosines Direction Cosines
for for for
Procedural Atributes Dimension I Dimension 2 Dimension 3
Adams's opportunity for
evidence presentation -. 668 -. 035 .744
Zemp's opportunity for
evidence presentation -. 370 -. 075 .926
Third-party control over process
of evidence presentation .936 -. 222 .274
Third-party control over the
final decision .952 -. 138 .273
Adams's control over process
of evidence presentation -. 818 -. 491 .300
Adams's control over the
final decision -. 978 -. 208 -. 001
Zemp's control over process of
evidence presentation -. 806 -. 490 .331
Zemp's control over the
final decision -. 977 -. 206 .057
Pleasantness .275 .937 .215
Fairness -. 716 .179 .674
Time the method will take -. 836 .446 .319
Likelihood the method will re-
sult in the best possible
decision -. 350 .291 .890
Certainty that a decision will
be made one way or the other .996 .045 .078
Favors Adams -. 990 -. 074 .121
Favors Zemp .973 -. 022 .229
* The larger the number (regardless of sign) the greater the correlation between an
attribute and a dimension and the better the attribute indicates a label for the dimen-
sion. Positive numbers indicate positive correlation. Negative numbers indicate negative
correlation.
evidence and fairness of the procedure are also highly positively cor-
related with dimension three, but they are to a high degree nega-
tively correlated with dimension one and hence are not suitable labels
for either dimension.
Given the correspondence of various attribute vectors with the three
dimensions, what are the appropriate labels for the dimensions? There
appear to be two levels of perception involved. For instance, the first
dimension can be considered operationally as the presence or absence
of third-party decision control, or it can be understood in terms of
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the more abstract concepts of the amount of time taken, the certainty
that a decision will be reached, and the extent to which each party
will be favored. The second dimension, which we informally labeled
the presence or absence of representatives or investigators, is also re-
lated to a more abstract concept-pleasantness. Perhaps individuals be-
lieve that representatives or investigators act as a buffer against severe
interpersonal conflict because they eliminate the need for direct in-
teraction between the disputants.53 The third dimension can be con-
sidered operationally as the opportunity for advantaged parties to
present evidence either by themselves or through a representative of
their own choosing.54 The dimension is also related to a more abstract
concept, the likelihood that a procedure will result in the best possible
decision (the decision closest to the truth). The respondents seemed
to associate this dimension with procedures involving third parties,
albeit not as controllers of the presentation of evidence. 55 Perhaps the
respondents believed that if litigants simply present their cases to
each other (as in bargaining), they may choose to ignore each other
or may prevent each other from making a complete presentation of
the evidence.
Thus, in selecting labels for each of the three dimensions there
seems to be a choice between certain operational features and the
abstract characteristics associated with these features. We decided to
53. Representatives or investigators might also be perceived to give a more expert and
persuasive presentation of the case, but this attribute was not assessed.
54. Although acceptable, it would not be strictly correct to label this a dimension of
opportunity for evidence presentation by both advantaged and disadvantaged parties,
because opportunity for evidence presentation by the disadvantaged party is also related
to the first dimension. See Table 2, p. 273 supra.
In our judgment, the labeling of the third dimension was decisively influenced by the
facts of the test case, in which one party had an extremely weak defense. Subjects may
have perceived that control over evidence presentation (formal process control) would
affect the arguments of the disadvantaged party more than those of the advantaged
party. The advantaged party would have a preponderance of favorable evidence to in-
fluence the third party regardless of the manner in which the facts were presented. If
the disadvantaged disputant were to sway the decisionmaker, in contrast, he would need
the opportunity to organize the facts in the most persuasive manner and supplement
them with whatever arguments could be devised. Consequently, subjects may have con-
sidered the disadvantaged side of the case to be more susceptible to the possible arbi-
trariness of third-party formal process control; hence its opportunity for evidence
presentation may have been perceived to be more closely related to the first dimension
than was the evidentiary opportunity of an advantaged party. In sum, we believe that
had subjects been asked to assume their roles as disputants or third parties without
consideration of the particular test case, the third dimension would probably have been
labeled opportunity for evidence presentation by both advantaged and disadvantaged
parties.
55. For instance, adversary and moot with representatives models had high positive
coordinates on dimension three, while single investigator (active judge) had a high nega-
tive coordinate. See Table 1, p. 270 supra.
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adopt operational labels because they can easily be discerned and de-
scribed in systems of procedure. The operational labels, being more
concrete, are of greater usefulness to policymakers, because they can
be affected directly by procedural modification. Hence, the three di-
mensions were labeled third-party decision control, presence or ab-
sence of representatives or investigators, and opportunity for the ad-
vantaged party to present evidence.
C. Preferences for the Procedures
After exploring the way in which the respondents perceived the
various procedures, the next task was to analyze the basis for their
preferences. As a preliminary step, a statistical analysis was conducted
to determine how procedural preferences differed as a function of
site and role." Figure 1 presents mean preferences for each site,
averaging across all roles.
The analysis revealed significant differences in preference as a
function of site, averaging across roles.57 Chapel Hill subjects pre-
ferred the adversary, double investigator, arbitration, autocratic, single
investigator (passive judge), and single investigator (active judge) pro-
cedures more than did Hamburg subjects.SS Hamburg subjects pre-
ferred mediation with representatives, moot with representatives, moot,
mediation, bargaining with representatives, and bargaining more than
did Chapel Hill subjects.50 Note that Chapel Hill subjects least pre-
ferred bargaining and most preferred the adversary procedure, while
Hamburg subjects least preferred the single investigator (active judge)
procedure and most preferred mediation with representatives. Analysis
did not detect any differences in preference as a function of role, but
role and site interacted to affect significantly preferences for three
56. A multihariate analysis of variance was performed. This is a statistical procedure
that indicates the likelihood that observed differences in preference were the product of
chance rather than the product of the site and role variables in the experiment. See D.
MORRISON, MULTIVARINIT STATISTICAL M LIIODS 159-206 (1967).
The tests were based on Rao's approximation of Wilk's lambda criterion. Because of
unequal cell frequencies, probability values for the "eliminating tests" are reported. See
Appelbaum & Cramer, Some Problems in the Nonorthogonal Analysis of Variance, 81
PbYcnOLOGlClL BULL. 335, 338-41 (1974).
A multivariate test involves analysis of more than one dependent measure. If the
results of the multivariate test arc significant, univariate analysis may be used as an aid
to clarify the results-of the multivariate tests by focusing on the relationship between
the independent measure and each dependent one in turn.
57. Multivariate p < .001. A difference is statistically defined to be significant when
statistical anal)sis yields an index of a size that would occur by chance less than 5 times
in 100 instances, written as p < .05. Smaller "p" values provide greater assurance that
the difference was not the result of chance.
58. All univariate tests p < .05.
59. All univariate tests p <.05.
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Figure 1. Mean Preference Rating for Procedures by Hamburg and










Third-Party Decision Control -- No Third-Party Decision Control-
TYPE OF PROCEDURE
Note: Procedures ordered as perceived by the subjects along a
dimension of decreasing third-party control.
of the procedures. 60 The Hamburg disadvantaged disputant preferred
the double investigator, single investigator (active judge), and single
investigator (passive judge) procedures more than did the other Ham-
burg roles, but the Chapel Hill disadvantaged disputant preferred
those procedures less than did the other Chapel Hill roles. In addition,
the Chapel Hill disputant most preferring the two single investigator
procedures was the party uncertain of his or her relative evidentiary
advantage.61
D. Dimensional Determinants of Procedural Preference
It is possible to map into the three-dimensional perceptual space
vectors that represent the respondents' preferences for procedures.
60. Multivariate p <.001.
61. All univariate tests p <.05.
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This technique illuminates the relationship between the dimensions
of perception and respondents' procedural preferences. Table 3 dis-
plays the transformed direction cosines of the average preference vector
for each of the eight combinations of role and site.0 2 The larger the
transformed direction cosine, whether positive or negative, the greater
is the correlation or association between the subject's preference and
the given dimension. Positive cosines indicate that procedures that
are increasingly valued along the given dimension are increasingly
preferred by the subject. Negative cosines indicate that procedures
that are increasingly valued along the given dimension are increasingly
TABLE 3
Transformed Direction Cosines of the Average Preference Vector
for Hamburg and Chapel Hill Subjects in All Roles*
Transformed Transformed Transformed
Direction Direction Direction
Site - Role Cosines for Cosines for Cosines for
Combination Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3
A. Hamburg Subjects
Uncertain of Relative Advantage -1.27 -. 05 .36
Advantaged Disputant (Zemp) - .82 .10 .28
Disadvantaged Disputant (Adams) - .76 .34 .02
Third Party -1.50 -. 02 .57
B. Chapel Hill Subjects
Uncertain of Relative Advantage .61 .46 .40
Advantaged Disputant (Zemp) .28 -. 10 .51
Disadvantaged Disputant (Adams) -. 08 -. 06 .53
Third Party .85 .14 .43
The larger the number (regardless of sign) the more preference is associated with that
dimension. Positive numbers indicate positive correlation. Negative numbers indicate
negative correlation.
62. In order to facilitate analysis of variance it was necessary to normalize the dis-
tribution of differences between direction cosines. The original distribution was highly
skewed, a normal property of cosines. Direction cosines were transformed according to
the following formula: / 1±cos)
transformed cosine = 1/ log. I CosI
1-Cos/
The following table equates some values of transformed cosines with their original values:
cosine transformed cosine cosine transformed cosine
.00 .000 .60 .693
.10 .100 .70 .867
.20 .203 .80 1.099
.30 .310 .90 1.472
.40 .424 .99 2.647
.50 .549
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disfavored by the subject. Cosines close to zero, whether negative or
positive, indicate that the given dimension is not an important de-
terminant of the subject's preference.
An informal examination of Table 3 reveals that a major difference
in preference exists between the Hamburg and the Chapel Hill sub-
jects with respect to the first dimension."3 Regardless of role, the
Hamburg subjects' preference vectors are negatively correlated with
the first dimension, indicating that they preferred procedures with
low third-party decision control. 4 Chapel Hill subjects' preferences,
in contrast, are (with only one exception) positively correlated with
the first dimension, indicating that they preferred procedures involv-
ing high third-party decision control.;
A joint effect of role and site demonstrates that these general state-
ments need to be qualified. 0 For Chapel Hill subjects, advantaged
and disadvantaged parties' preferences are not significantly related
to the dimension of third-party decision control, while the preferences
of third parties and disputants uncertain of their relative evidentiary
advantage are significantly related to that dimension. For Hamburg
subjects, advantaged and disadvantaged parties' preferences are re-
lated negatively to third-party decision control, but the significant
negative relationship is not as strong as it is for third parties and
disputants uncertain of their relative advantage.
The small absolute values of the transformed direction cosines for
dimension two indicate that the presence or absence of investigators
or representatives has no appreciable relationship with preference,
although averaging across all conditions indicates a slight preference
for the participation of such persons. Neither role nor site exerted
significant effects upon the extent to which dimension two affected
preferences. There was, however, a small interactive effect of role
and site, such that disadvantaged Hamburg disputants and Chapel Hill
disputants uncertain of their relative evidentiary advantage most pre-
ferred procedures with representatives or investigators.
T
The third dimension was an important determinant of preference,
with both Hamburg and Chapel Hill subjects preferring procedures
that maximized the advantaged party's opportunity for evidence pre-
sentation. 8 Several other findings are also worthy of consideration.
63. Multivariate p < .001; univariate p < .001.
64. Average direction cosine is significantly different from zero, p <.001.
65. Average direction cosine is significantly different from zero, p <.012.
66. Multivariate p <.020; univariate p <.023.
67. Univariate p <.04.
68. Univariate p < .001.
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For all Hamburg roles, third-party decision control is a more important
determinant of preference than is the advantaged party's opportunity
for evidence presentation. For Chapel Hill subjects, however, this is
true only for third parties and for disputants uncertain of their relative
evidentiary advantage. For Chapel Hill disputants who knew their
relative advantage, the advantaged party's opportunity for evidence
presentation is more highly related to preference than is third-party
decision control.
These differences in dimensional determinants of preference en-
able us to explain observed differences in expressed preferences. The
major difference in preference between the Hamburg and Chapel Hill
subjects occurs because Hamburg subjects prefer procedures that lack
third-party decision control, while Chapel Hill subjects generally
prefer procedures that incorporate third-party decision control. A
glance at Figure 1 confirms this. There is, however, a striking simi-
larity between the two sites. The preference ordering within pro-
cedures classified as high or low in third-party decision control is
roughly the same for both Chapel Hill and Hamburg subjects, as can
be seen by viewing Figure 1 as divided in half by a line parallel to
the "Mean Preference Rating" axis and by comparing, within each
half, the preference rankings of the subjects at the two sites. This
similarity is. a consequence of the preference of subjects at both sites
for procedures that enhance the opportunity for the advantaged party
to present evidence. 9
IV. Discussion
The results of this study provide unique insights into individuals'
perceptions of and preferences for procedures to resolve conflicts.Y'
69. The differcnccs in dimcnsional dctcrminants of prefercnce also help to explain
the joint effect of rolc and site upon preference for the single investigator (active judge),
single investigator (passive judge), and double investigator proccdurcs. Disadvantaged
litigants at Hamburg preferred thesc procedures more than did othcr Hamburg roles be-
cause of a greater preference for the presence of investigators or representatives. Chapel
Hill disadvantaged litigants preferred these procedures less than other Chapel Hill roles
because of a slight prefcrence for a lack of investigators or representatives and a slight
preference for a lack of third-party decision control. Chapel Hill subjects uncertain of
their relative evidentiary advantage preferred the two single investigator procedures more
than the other roles because of their apparent preference for procedures that employ
representatives or investigators.
70. These insights, of course, are derived from a particular investigation and, hence,
may not be applicable in other situations. But doubts about the generalization of research
findings are nearly always present; they can never be fully resolved. Since these insights
are the fruit of a number of studies, the results of which have been largely consistent,
sec pp. 280-82 infra, there are reasonable grounds for confidence in the conclusions we
reach.
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With respect to perceptions, the major conclusion is that three op-
erational criteria are basic to individuals' conceptualization of pro-
cedures: degree of third-party decision control, presence or absence of
representatives or investigators, and degree of opportunity for evi-
dence presentation by the advantaged party. One can think of these
three criteria as defining a three-dimensional space. Every procedure
can be located somewhere in the space; its precise location depends
on the procedure's location on each of the three dimensions. In the
same way that points on the earth's surface are located in terms of
latitude, longitude, and elevation, so procedures can be described in
relation to one another in terms of third-party decision control,
presence or absence of investigators or representatives, and oppor-
tunity for evidence presentation by the advantaged party. This con-
clusion appears to be true regardless of cultural familiarity and re-
gardless of the role that an individual assumes.
We have stressed the importance of determining the degree to which
the results of this investigation of the unconstrained perception and
differentiation of procedures correspond to the results of previous
research. On the basis of previous research it was predicted that two
dimensions that subjects would use to differentiate among procedures
would be third-party decision control and control over the process of
evidence presentation. One of the three dimensions was indeed third-
party decision control. In fact, third-party decision control was the
most salient dimension that subjects perceived in differentiating among
procedures. Contrary to expectation, however, control over the process
of evidence presentation was not perceived as a dimension distinct
from third-party decision control.
In our judgment, this apparent inconsistency with our prediction
resulted from a confusion in terminology. Asking subjects to evaluate
the attribute of "control over the process of evidence presentation"
may have suggested to them that they were to rate control over the
formal aspects of evidence presentation rather than control over the
actual evidence presented. Had the subjects been asked to evaluate
"control over the presentation of evidence," it is possible that this
attribute would have provided a label for the third dimension. This
suggestion is supported by the observation that the very similar at-
tribute of opportunity for evidence presentation is highly correlated
with the third dimension and very nearly provides a proper label for
that dimension. 1 Hence, there is reason to believe that if the "process
71. See note 54 supra.
280
Vol. 86: 258, 1976
Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences
control" attribute had been stated slightly differently our prediction
that one dimension would be control over evidence presentation would
have been correct.
Thus, our results in large part support the predictions, derived
from previous empirical research, that two basic dimensions that sub-
jects use to discriminate among procedures are third-party control
over the final decision and disputant control over the process by which
evidence is presented. The existence of a third dimension (the second
most salient) was not predicted. Although the presence or absence of
representatives or investigators was not important in previous studies,
it now appears that individuals involved in conflicts are aware that
different methods of dispute resoluO0n may be differentially successful
in mitigating the intensity of their disagreements and that in judging
among procedures they pay attention to this aspect of settlement.
72
Ultimately, though, this dimension has only a negligible effect on
preferences.
The multidimensional scaling technique allows us to do more than
simply understand the framework by which individuals conceptualize
procedures. It also helps us to determine the relation between indi-
viduals' perceptions of procedures and their preferences for them.
Within the three-dimensional perceptual space it is possible to draw
a preference vector that runs between the least and the most preferred
procedures. The relation of the preference vector to the three dimen-
sions indicates what combination of the three dimensions individuals
would prefer. The results of the present study show that the two most
important determinants of procedural preferences are third-party de-
cision control and opportunity for the advantaged party to present evi-
dence. Both Hamburg and Chapel Hill subjects, regardless of role,
exhibited greater preference for procedures allowing full opportunity
for evidence presentation. A divergence occurred, however, with re-
spect to the dimension of third-party decision control. Participants in
Chapel Hill preferred third-party decision control, but those in Ham-
burg were averse to it. Even Hamburg subjects who role-played third
parties did not desire responsibility for the final decision. 73 Those in
72. The conclusion that individuals perceive representatives or investigators largely as
buffers between disputants is inferred from the high positive correlation between dimen-
sion two and the attribute of pleasantness. See Table 2, p. 273 supra.
73. Inquiry was made in Germany, but no studies were located to assist in interpreting
this finding. There do appear to be some reasonable speculations. Perhaps in reaction to
Germany's pre-1945 experience with highly centralized, autocratic government, young
adults in Hamburg distrust authoritarian systems and disfavor authoritarian interven-
tion. Or, it may be that young German adults reject third-party decision control because
they feel that there is sufficient solidarity or common interest among them to achieve
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Hamburg did appreciate, however, having a third party to listen to
the disputants, help them explore the issues, and make some sugges-
tions for resolution. As a consequence, Hamburg subjects most pre-
ferred mediation and moot procedures.
Nonetheless, because both Hamburg and Chapel Hill subjects prefer
greater opportunity for evidence presentation regardless of third-party
decision control, their procedural preferences are essentially the same
for a given level of such control. Hence, within the range of procedures
traditionally found in the formal legal process, which typically involve
third-party decisionmaking, preference is not affected by the dif-
ferences in legal culture represented in the present study. Where third-
party decision control is mandated participants in both Hamburg and
Chapel Hill prefer to use an adversary procedure. Given third-party
decision control, an adversary model maximizes the opportunity for
evidence presentation. Also, though the presence or absence of repre-
sentatives had only a slight positive effect on preferences in Hamburg
and Chapel Hill, it should be noted that the adversary system typically
provides'for the participation of representatives who serve as buffers
against direct confrontation.
Thus, despite some differences created by nationality and role,74 in-
dividuals in both Chapel Hill and Hamburg seem not only to share
the same basic perception of procedural systems but also to share the
same basic preferences with respect to procedures commonly employed
in formal legal decisionmaking. This conclusion is consistent with the
results of earlier research 75 and is particularly significant because it
is based on the reaction of unconstrained subjects.
the resolution of disputes without vesting decisionmaking control in a third party.
Chapel Hill subjects, in contrast, may believe that their conflict is so severe that settle-
ment can only be attained through the decisionmaking of an uninvolved third party.
74. Apart from the impact of site on preference, it was predicted that the preferences
of individuals involved in a dispute would be affected by their role in its resolution. In
particular, it was hypothesized that third-party preferences would be affected more by a
dimension of third-party decision control than by a dimension of control over the
process of evidence presentation. This was confirmed by the present study (although, as
indicated, Hamburg third-party preferences were affected negatively).
It was also expected that disputant preferences would be affected more by control over
the process of evidence presentation than by third-party decision control. This was not
borne out for Hamburg disputants because of extreme aversion to third-party decision
control. It was confirmed for Chapel Hill disputants informed of their relative evidentiary
advantage but not for those uncertain of the role to which they would later be
assigned. Indeed, those uncertain of their position seemed very similar to third parties
-they were somewhat more concerned with third-party decision control than they were
with control over the process of evidence presentation. Perhaps for Chapel Hill subjects,
being uncertain about one's relative advantage led to an objectivity of perspective similar
to that of uninvolved third parties and thereby to similar procedural preferences.
75. See J. TnIBAUT & L. WVALKER, supra note 5, at 118.
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V. Implications for Legal Policy
In the continuing assessment of procedures for governmental deci-
sionmaking, a major element in determining which procedures are
acceptable is the perception of the participants in the process. Our
research suggests that the participants prefer to control the process of
evidence presentation themselves while a third party controls the re-
sult. Yet recent decisions of the Supreme Court appear to reflect a
movement toward autocratic procedures and away from the preferred
procedures. In Arnett v. Kennedy0 a nonprobationary federal em-
ployee in the competitive Civil Service was discharged according to a
statutory pretermination procedure that provided: "Examination of
witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided in
the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension
without pay."7 7 The Court approved the procedure in a plurality opin-
ion that noted that the statute did not accord "a full adversary hear-
ing."73 In Mathews v. Eldridge"9 a person whose Social Security dis-
ability benefits had been terminated challenged the pretermination
procedure. The procedure, which was approved by the Court, did not
provide an evidentiary hearing. Instead, the decision to terminate was
made largely on the basis of information developed by a state agency,
which was also the effective decisionmaker 8 0
Such elements as decision without notice, investigation by the de-
cisionmaker, the absence of representatives, the absence of party con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses, the use of evidence out-
side the record, and an interested or activist decisionmaker all tend
in the autocratic direction and hence would probably diminish satis-
faction. Any mechanism or device that tends to increase control of
the decisionmaker beyond the responsibility of determining the out-
come can be expected to diminish the acceptability of the procedure.
Any procedural system that is largely decisionmaker-controlled is likely
to receive a low degree of acceptance. It appears that American
citizens are most satisfied with procedures that include a decisionmaker
but that otherwise grant control to the parties and provide them with
representatives. Given the existence of a third-party decisionmaker,
this feeling about procedure seems to be free of cultural limits and,
hence, probably would not change even if somewhat autocratic pro-
76. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
78. 416 U.S. at 154.
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).80. The procedure is described in id. at 337-39.
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cedures were more widely established. In accepting or rejecting a
particular procedure a policymaker should assess whether the pro-
cedure apportions more control to the decisionmaker than is necessary
to determine the outcome. If the procedure does, the policymaker can
reasonably estimate that the procedure ranks poorly in terms of par-
ticipant satisfaction.
It is true that our earlier research suggests "autocratic procedures
are likely to be sought by men in hurried pursuit of common goals
who agree on a standard (a credo or an ideological canon) that can be
quickly applied to resolve differences in belief."Sl Verkuil has else-
where thoroughly discussed this special type of dispute and the pro-
cedures that may be appropriate to resolve it."' But relatively few
disputes that require official intervention possess all three character-
istics (correspondent interests, existing standards, and time pressure).
Most disputes requiring official intervention are conflicts of interest, 3
like the present study's test case, where victory for one party means
defeat for the other.
Conflicts in which a government agency effectively takes the role
of a disputant opposing a private citizen are probably best seen as
conflicts of interest. Both Arnett and Mathews involved conflicts of
interest. In part, the government represented interests opposed to the
individual disputants: potential federal employees, claimants of gov-
ernment benefits, and, of course, taxpayers. No result in these cases
could maximize the interests of all disputants.
It should be clearly recognized that these suggestions about legal
policy are made solely with reference to the criterion of satisfaction.
Other important criteria might well be considered in determining the
constitutionality of procedures. Some of the most difficult questions
relate to efficiency, because procedures that apportion control to dis-
putants and adequately ensure the exercise of their control may be
more costly than autocratic systems. Yet in a democratic polity legal
policymakers should give particular attention to constructing pro-
cedures that are likely to be accepted and trusted by the public. Ul-
timately, those procedures may prove to be the least costly.
81. J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 5, at 16.
82. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 752-56.
83. The term "conflict of interest" is used, as it is in social psychology, to describe a
two-party dispute that can be resolved in favor of one party only if the other party loses.
See Kelley & Thibaut, Group Problem Solving, in IV THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
oGY 1, 12, 33-34 (2d ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969). This broad meaning should be
distinguished from the term's more technical sense when used to refer to ethical problems
such as those governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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Appendix
A. Test Case Summary
Adams (the defendant) and Zemp (the plaintiff) have been close
friends for years. Recently they began to gamble heavily together
and, as matters became involved, met at a tavern to discuss their re-
lationship. After a period of conversation Zemp (the plaintiff) knocked
Adams (the defendant) to the floor and threw an object in his direc-
tion. Adams (the defendant) responded by stabbing Zemp (the plain-
tiff) in the stomach with a piece of glass.
The law provides that it is unlawful to use more force in repelling
an attack than a person believes necessary or than a reasonable person




1. Third Party-Under this procedure the hearing will be con-
ducted by a third party appointed by the experimenter from a pool
of law students. He will actively seek the facts at the hearing by re-
questing them from Zemp and Adams. When he has decided, that
he has all of the facts necessary to reach a decision, he will close the
hearing, deliberate and announce his decision.
2. Investigators or Representatives-There will be no investigators
or representatives.




1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be ap-
pointed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third
party will passively receive the facts of the case from representatives
* In original materials, words in brackets did not appear. Letters were randomly as-
signed to Use procedures, and hence the order of presentation here is also random.
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of Zemp and Adams. When the representatives have concluded their
presentations, the third party will close the hearing, deliberate, and
announce his decision.
2. Investigators or Representatives-Representatives will be chosen
by Zemp and Adams from a pool of law students. Each will prepare
and present a case based on the evidence for the side he represents.
During the hearing the representatives may oppose each other's pres-
entations through questioning and rebuttal.
3. Disputants-Zemp and Adams will meet with their representa-
tives prior to the hearing to turn over and discuss the facts.
Hearing Procedure C
[Mediation]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be ap-
pointed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third
party will passively receive the facts of the case from Zemp and Adams.
When Zemp and Adams have concluded their presentations, the third
party will discuss the evidence with them. He will then deliberate and
suggest a resolution of the dispute.
2. Investigators or Representatives-There will be no investigators
or representatives.
3. Disputants-Zemp and Adams will present their own cases-cases
based on the evidence they have been given. They may oppose each
other's presentation through questioning and rebuttal. After the third
party has suggested a resolution of the case, Zemp and Adams will
have to decide whether they wish to accept this solution. If either
does not, they must work out a solution of their own.
Hearing Procedure D
[Bargaining with Representatives]
1. Third Party-There is no third party.
2. Investigators or Representatives-Representatives will be chosen
by Zemp and Adams from a pool of law students. The representatives,
in consultation with the disputants, will meet together to discuss the
facts and decide on a resolution of the dispute.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing, Zemp and Adams will meet
with their respective representatives to turn over and discuss the facts.
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Disputants will also consult with their respective representatives dur-
ing the negotiation.
(Remember: Neither in this nor in any other of the twelve pro-
cedures may the payment be divided.)
Hearing Procedure E
[Single Investigator (Passive Judge)]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be ap-
pointed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. He will,
however, be assisted by an investigator whom he will appoint from
a pool of law students. The third party will passively receive the
facts of the case from his investigator. When the investigator has
concluded his presentation the third party will close the hearing,
deliberate, and announce his decision.
2. Investigators or representatives-An investigator appointed by
the third party will actively seek the facts from Zemp and Adams
before the hearing. He will then prepare a case, based on the evi-
dence, for each side and present both cases to the third party.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing Zemp and Adams will furnish
the facts requested by the investigator.
Hearing Procedure F
[Bargaining]
1. Third Party-There is no third party.
2. Investigators or Representatives-There are no investigators or
representatives.
3. Disputants-Under this procedure Zemp and Adams will meet
together to discuss the facts and decide on a resolution of the dispute.
(Remember: Neither in this nor in any other of the twelve pro-
cedures may the payment be divided.)
Hearing Procedure G
[Double Investigator]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be appoint-
ed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. He will, however,
The Yale Law Journal
be assisted by two investigators whom he will appoint from a pool of
law students. The third party will passively receive the facts of the
case from his two investigators. When the investigators have concluded
their presentations, the third party will close the hearing, deliberate,
and announce his decision.
2. Investigators or Representatives-Two investigators, appointed
by the third party, will actively seek the facts of the case. One in-
vestigator will be assigned to each disputant, but the investigators
are representatives of the third party and not of either Zemp or
Adams. One investigator will obtain the facts from Zemp. The other
investigator will obtain the facts from Adams. They will each prepare
and present a case based on the evidence for the side to which they
are assigned. During the hearing the investigators may ask questions
about the facts presented by the other investigator.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing Zemp and Adams will furnish




1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be ap-
pointed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third
party will passively receive the facts from the representatives of Zemp
and Adams. When the representatives have concluded their presenta-
tions, the third party will discuss the evidence with them. He will
then deliberate and suggest a resolution of the dispute.
2. Investigators or Representatives-Representatives will be chosen
by Zemp and Adams from a pool of law students. Each will prepare
and present a case based on the evidence for the side he represents.
They may oppose each other's presentation through questioning and
rebuttal. After the third party has suggested a resolution of the dispute,
each representative will consult with the party he represents and the
parties will decide whether they wish to accept this solution. If not,
the representatives, in consultation with the parties they represent,
must work out a solution of their own.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing Zemp and Adams will meet
with their respective representatives to turn over and discuss the facts.
After the third party has suggested a resolution of the case, Zemp and
Adams in consultation with their representatives will have to decide
whether they wish to accept this solution. If either party does not,
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1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be appoint-
ed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third party
will passively receive the facts of the case from Zemp and Adams.
When Zemp and Adams have concluded their presentations, Zemp,
Adams, and the third party will discuss the evidence. All three (the
third party, Adams, and Zemp) will have to agree unanimously upon
a resolution of the dispute.
2. Investigators or Representatives-There will be no investigators
or representatives.
3. Disputants-Zemp and Adams will present their own cases-cases
based on the evidence they have been given. Together with the third
party they will discuss the evidence. Both Zemp and Adams and the
third party will have to agree upon a resolution of the dispute.
Hearing Procedure J
[Arbitration]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be appoint-
ed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third party
will passively receive the facts of the case from Zemp and Adams.
When Zemp and Adams have concluded their presentations, the third
party will close the hearing, deliberate, and announce his decision.
2. Investigators or Representatives-There will be no investigators
or representatives.
3. Disputants-Zemp and Adams will present their own cases-
cases based on the evidence they have been given. They may oppose
each other's presentations through questioning and rebuttal.
Hearing Procedure K
[Moot with Representatives]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure a third party will be appoint-
ed by the experimenter from a pool of law students. The third party
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will passively receive the facts of the case from the representatives of
Zemp and Adams. When the representatives have concluded their pres-
entations the two representatives and the third party will discuss the
evidence. All three (the third party and the two representatives) will
have to agree unanimously upon a resolution of the dispute.
2. Investigators or Representatives-Representatives will be chosen
by Zemp and Adams from a pool of law students. Each will prepare
and present a case based on the evidence for the side he represents.
Both of the representatives and the third party will have to agree
upon a resolution of the dispute.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing Zemp and Adams will meet
with their respective representatives to turn over and discuss the facts.
Hearing Procedure L
[Single Investigator (Active Judge)]
1. Third Party-Under this procedure the hearing will be largely
conducted by a third party appointed by the experimenter from a pool
of law students. He will, however, be assisted by an investigator whom
he will appoint from a pool of law students. The third party will ac-
tively seek the facts at the hearing by requesting them from his in-
vestigator. When he has decided that he has all of the facts necessary
to reach a decision, he will close the hearing, deliberate, and announce
his decision.
2. Investigators or Representatives-An investigator appointed by
the third party will actively seek the facts from Zemp and Adams
before the hearing. He will then furnish the facts requested to the
third party.
3. Disputants-Prior to the hearing Zemp and Adams will furnish
the facts requested by the investigator.
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